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CURRENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-FINDINGS OF FACT-CONCLUSVENESS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION-The Secretary of Agriculture, under authority of the "Meat
Inspection" Act of June 3o, i9o6, promulgated a regulation prohibiting in inter-
state commerce the use of cereal in excess of two per cent. in "sausage," and
requiring the presence of cereal to be stated on the label. The purpose was to
prevent deception of the public, a purpose within the purview of the Act of
Congress. The appellee, a sausage manufacturer, sought to enjoin the enforce-
ment of the regulation on the ground that sausage containing more than two
per cent. cereal, as did that manufactured by him, was wholesome and healthful,
and that the use of the word "sausage" in his products was not deceptive.
Held, that the injunction would not be granted. Houston et al. v. St. Louis
Independent Packing Co. (Apr. 14, 19Y9) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, 1918.
Admitting the wholesome nature of appellee's product, it was still apparent
that the inclusion of unnamed ingredients, such as cereals, might make the
term "sausage" deceptive to the uninstructed consumer. Whether it was thus
deceptive was a question of fact, the determination of which, in the absence of
bad faith or excess of delegated authority, was within the exclusive discretion
of the Secretary of Agriculture, an adminstrative officer, and was not reviewable
by the courts, provided there was substantial evidence to sustain the finding of
fact. That there was such evidence was apparent in this case. For a similar
legal doctrine applied to the findings of other executive officers, see Decatur v.
Paulding (184o, U. S.) 14 Pet. 497 (Secretary of the Navy); Gaines v/.
Thompson (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 347 (Secretary of the Interior); Bates &
Guild Co. v. Payne (19o4) 194 U. S. lO6, 24 Sup. Ct. 595 (Postmaster General);
Zakonaite v. Wolf (1912) 226 U. S.272, 33 Sup. Ct. 31 (Secretary of Commerce).
BILS AND NoTES-PAYEE AS HOLDER IN DuE COuRsE--EF CT OF N. I. L- By
the fraud of the maker the defendant was induced to endorse a note for
accommodation. The plaintiff took the note for value and without notice of
any irregularity. He was compelled to take up the note at maturity, sued the
defendant endorser and obtained judgment. Held, that the judgment was
correct. Johnston v. Knipe (1918, Pa.) lO5 Atl. 705.
This same decision, as reported in io3 Atl. 957, has already been noted in
these pages. See (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 197, where a fuller statement
of facts and authorities will be found. In its earlier form, the opinion went on
the ground that the N. I. L. had not in any way changed the conceded common-
law rule that a payee might be a holder in due course. The provisions of sec.
30, enumerating ways of negotiation, were held not to exclude by omission a
negotiation to the payee. This is sense. But the new opinion is decidedly
buttressed by a reference to sec. 64, which provides for liability to the payee
of an endorser before delivery. While this does not expressly cover the case
of a maker who negotiates a note to the payee through an agent, it is sufficiently
at variance with the expressio unius interpretation of sec. 30 to strongly indi-
cate, at least, what the weight of what little authority there is, has decided:
that the codifiers did not intentionally draw that section in violation of common
law, sense and custom.
CORPORATIONS-DIsTRiBUTION OF DMDENDS-ARBITRARY WITHHOLDING ON THE
PART OF DmEcos.-The defendant corporation had a capital of 2 million; its
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yearly profits amounted to 6o million; the extensions proposed to 24 million;
and the cash in hand and municipal bonds to 54 million. Action was brought
to compel the declaration of an extra dividend. Held, that a decree ordering
the defendant to distribute ig million was proper. Dodge et al. v. The Ford
Motor Co. et al. (igig, Mich.) i7o N. W. 668.
Although it is for the board of directors, and not for the stockholders, to
decide whether dividends shall be declared, the directors may not arbitrarily
refuse to divide profits. Whether there has been such an arbitrary refusal as
calls for interference by equity is a question of fact, in the determination of
which the amount of profits, of capital stock, and the nature of the business
should be primarily considered. Stevens v. United States Steel Corp. (1905,
Ch.) 68 N. J. Eq. 373, 59 Atl. 9o5 (profits 66 million, capital stock I billion;
withholding not arbitrary); Raynolds v. Diamond Paper Mills Co. (i9o5, Ch.)
69 N. J. Eq. 29o, 6o Atl. 941 (assets of corporation doubled; but the business
required constant expansion). Under the facts of the principal case, the deci-
sion reached seems clearly right. It is to be commended as a protection of
minority holders against the arbitrary acts of a numerically small majority.
EVIDENcE- DYING DECLARATIONS - "SHOT WITHOUT PROVOCATION" NOT AN
OPINION-In a prosecution for homicide, the state offered in evidence a dying
declaration in writing signed by the deceased, that he was "shot without provo-
cation." Held, that the declaration was admissible as a statement of fact.
State v. McNair (i918, Utah) I78 Pac. 48.
Dying declarations, if admitted at all, should be admitted irrespective of the
form in which they are made. The "opinion" rule should not be applied to
exclude such a declaration when it is impossible to have the declarant present
the facts in any other form. 2 Wigmore, Evidence, 1447. The principal case
is believed sound as the declaration is predominantly a concise statement of
facts-what the deceased did not do. To exclude it as an opinion would
render valuable evidence inadmissible merely because of the words in which
it came, by pure chance, to be expressed; a dying layman does not and cannot
pick his phrases with reference to rules over which even lawyers hight. See
(I918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 700; cf: (1917) 26 ibid. 505.
EVDENCiE-PEDIGREE-RE.ATIONSHn--CoMmuNiTy-REPUTATION-In an action
to recover land, the sole question was whether the plaintiff was the brother of
a decedent. The defendant, in refutation of this relationship, offered in evi-
dence the general reputation in the community thereon. Held, that such repu-
tation was inadmissible. Ashe v. Pettiford (1919, N. C.) 98 S. E. 304.
Community-reputation, though admissible to establish marriage, is not
admitted to establish blood relationship. Elder v. The State (1899) 123 Ala.
35, 26 So. 213; Lamar v. Allen (1899) io8 Ga. i58, 33 S. E. 958; Vowles v.
Young (i8o6, Eng. Ch.) 13 Ves. Jr. i4o. The rule has been criticized, in cases
where more direct methods of proof are unavailable. 2 Wigmore, Evidence,
1953. And a few states admit the evidence, either by statute or at common
law. State v. McDonald (i9IO) 55 Ore. 419, io6 Pac. 444; Carter v. Mont-
gomery (1875) 2 Tenn. Ch. 227; Ewell v. The State (1834, Tenn.) 6 Yerg. 364.
INTERSTATE ComERCE-FEDERAL EmPLoYERs' LIABI' AcT-WoRxmEN'S
COMPENSATION.--The decedent was employed by the railroad company as a
laborer. While shoveling snow from the tracks, which were used for both
interstate and intrastate transportation, he was struck by a passing train and
later died from the injuries. His widow received an award under the New
York Workmen's Compensation Act. Held, that the award must be set aside,
as the employer was engaged in interstate commerce and the case was governed
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by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. New York Central R. R. v. Porter
(March 3, 1919) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, 1918, No. 134.
The decision is another illustration of the difficulty of determining whether
an act of an employee falls within interstate commerce. See Flynn v. New
York, S. & W. R. Co. (1917, N. J. Sup. Ct.) ioi Atl. io34. The test sought to
be applied to each case is whether the employee at the time of the injury was
engaged in interstate transportation or work so closely related to it as to be
practically part of it. Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. (1916) 239 U. S.
556, 36 Sup. Ct. 188. If the court decides he was, there can be no recovery
under the state Workmen's Compensation Acts. New York Central R. R. v.
Winfield (1917) 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546. See (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 135; (1916) 25 ibid. 497.
INDICTMENT-GRAND JURY-PUBLIc EXAMINATION OF WITNEssEs.-The
defendant filed a plea in abatement to an indictment charging him with receiv-
ing a stolen automobile, but was tried and convicted. The facts, stated in the
plea and admitted by the commonwealth, were that while the cause was being
heard by the grand jury one or more persons, witnesses in the case, were in the
grand jury room while other witnesses were testifying. Held, that the plea in
abatement was sufficient. Comonwealth v. Harris (i919, Mass.) 121 N. E. 409.
The court decided that the wrong complained of was the violation of a sub-
stantial right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights which made an indictment or
presentment of a grand jury essential to the validity of a conviction in cases of
prosecution for felonies; that an "indictment" must be found in pursuance
of methods of grand juries established in England and Massachusetts, the oath
of which is still to keep secret "the commonwealth's counsel, your fellow's,
and your own." For a criticism of the grand jury system, see (i9o6) 15 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 178.
INSURANCE-FORM OF PoLIcy-NONCOMPLIANE WITH STATUTE-EFFECT OF
APPROVAL By Co1,MIssIoNER.-A statute providing for a standard accident and
health insurance policy, required that any portion of a policy which purported
"by reason of circumstances under which a loss is incurred, to reduce the indem-
nity . . . shall be printed in bold faced type and with greater prominence
than any other portion of the text of the policy." The defendant issued to
the plaintiff such a policy with the clause not printed in bold faced type. The
insurance commissioner approved the form of the policy in question but warned
the defendant of the above statute. The plaintiff was injured under circum-
stances covered by this clause which the defendant set up as a defense against
payment of the whole amount of the policy. Held, that under the act the clause
was no defense. Williams v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (I918, Wis.) 169 N. W. 6og.
This decision seems sound, in view of the fact that the statute is unambigu-
ous. The court applied the general doctrine that contemporaneous or executive
construction of a statute is of no weight with the court when the terms and
meaning of the statute are clear. See 36 Cyc. 1139, note 57; and 1142, note 73.
This statute is an example of the ever growing legislation relative to insurance
and the standardization of policies other than those covering death and fire. Cf.
(I918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 193.
LIFE INSURANCE-AsSIGNMENT-CHANGE OF BENEFIciRY.-One Anderson
took out two policies of life insurance with his wife as beneficiary. Both con-
tained clauses setting out the formalities for changing the beneficiary and
assigning the policies. Anderson assigned the said policies to the defendant
as security for a loan. After his death the plaintiff, who was still named as
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beneficiary of the policies, sued the defendant for the proceeds. Held, that she
could recover, as the assignment did not of itself change the beneficiary.
Anderson v. Broad Street National Bank (1918, N. J. Eq.) io5 Atl. 599.
It seems clear that an assignment of a policy transfers the powers and rights
thereunder and vests them in the assignee. See (1918) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL,
1o83. But the principal case is sound in holding an assignment not to be of
itself an exercise of the power to change the beneficiary. For a distinction
between the various powers of the holder of a policy, see (igig) 28 ibid., 603.
STATE LIABILIry TO Surr-INuNCTION AGAINST ToRT-STATP WILL NOT BE
ENJOINED FROM BOMBING PRACTICE IN AVIATION ScHooL.-The owner of a farm
in Germany sought to enjoin the Government from practicing bomb dropping
in a neighboring aviation school, which practice he claimed endangered his
workmen and interfered seriously with his use of the farm. Held, that the
injunction could not be granted. Oberlandesgericht Koenigsberg, Sept. 20, 1917,
printed in (1918) 45 Clunet, 1294.
The court concluded that bombing was an exercise of the sovereign military
power and that the farm might be considered as requisitioned for military
purposes during the bombing practice. If the farmer was injured the court
said he might bring an action against the state for damages. In the United
States, neither an injunction nor damages could probably be obtained in a
similar case, because the injury, if any, arises out of tort. The line of division
between the appropriation of private property for the public use and the uncom-
pensated injury by the state to which all private property is subject, is not
clear and will doubtless continue to be worked out empirically. See Langford v.
United States (1879) 101 U. S. 341; United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co. (1884)
112 U. S. 645, 5 Sup. Ct. 306; United States v. Lynah (19o3) 188 U. S. 445, 23
Sup. Ct. 349.
TOaTS-MENTAL SUFFERING-DELAY IN TRANSPORTING DEAD BoDY.-Owing
to the negligence of the defendant, the body of the plaintiff's deceased father
was not placed on a certain train. As a result, it was necessary to postpone
the funeral four hours, which postponement caused the plaintiff to suffer a
severe mental and nervous shock from which she did not recover for several
days. Held, that there could be no recovery, as there was no physical tort
resulting in injury to person or purse. McNeal v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.
(xgig, Ga.) 98 S. E. 409.
For a discussion of the right to recover for mental suffering where there is
no ."physical invasion" of the plaintiff's rights, see (1919) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAJL, 508. On mental suffering generally, see RECENT CASE NOTES, p. 707,
supra.
TRUSTS-EXPECTANCY-SuBJEcT OF EXECUTION.-Realty was conveyed to a
trustee who, upon the death of the grantor, was to convey to the heirs of the
grantor. The trustee was empowered, if he so desired, to reconvey to the
grantor at any time, and terminate the trust. While the grantor was alive, his
daughter conveyed her interest under this trust to her husband. The plaintiffs,
judgment creditors of the husband, sought to subject the interest to their lien.
Held, that the interest of the husband was a mere expectancy and not subject
to execution. Doctor v. Hughes (i9ig, N. Y.) 122 N. E. 221.
The court reasoned that the direction to convey to the settlor's heirs was
equivalent to the reservation of a reversion, not to the creation of a remainder;
they would take, if at all, by descent and not by purchase; and their interest was
subject to be barred by deed or will. They thus had, during the settlor's life, a
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mere expectancy. But the court intimates that the ancient common-law rule may
have been changed from one of property to one of construction, so that unmis-
takable words might have created a remainder in the settlor's own heirs.
UN rAm BusINEss-REsTIcTION ON RESALE PRICE-REFUSING TO SELL TO CUS-
TOMERS WHO CUT PRicEs.-To an order by the Federal Trade Commission,
requiring a company to cease indicating to dealers minimum resale prices and
to cease refusing to sell to dealers who refuse to maintain such prices, the com-
pany agreed. Federal Trade Commission Bulletin, April 22, 1919, it re Auto
Strop Razor Co.
A similar order was issued to another company which apparently has not
agreed. Federal Trade Commission Bulletin, April -22, 1gg, in re Clayton F.
Summy Co.
Under the interpretation put by the courts on the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
refusal to sell to dealers who cut the desired or agreed retail price, gives no
right of action to the dealer concerned. See (i919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
505. This raises an interesting question as to the enforceability of the Trade
Commission's order. That the practice itself is, at least in some cases, recog-
nized by the offender itself as undesirable is indicated by the very general
agreement by the parties concerned to these and other orders of the Commis-
sion.
Wha POWERS-FEDERAL CONTROL OF RAILRoA)S-JUnSDICTioN OF STATE
COURTS.- The plaintiff sued the principal defendant, a foreign railroad cor-
poration, for damages to a shipment of cattle delivered to it in October, 1917,
and summoned the Mobile & Ohio Railroad as garnishee. The latter set up
that the process served upon it was void and the court without jurisdiction
because the railroad systems of both corporations had been taken under federal
control pursuant to the Presidential Proclamation of December 26, 1917, and
the Act of Congress of March 21, i918. The trial court adopting this view,
discharged the garnishee. Held, that the State court had jurisdiction and that
the dismissal of the garniihee was erroneous. L. N. Dantzler Lumber Co. v.
Texas & Pacific Ry. (1919, Miss.) 8o So. 770.
The court construed the Act of Congress as not intended "to suspend the
collection of debts" or to grant carriers "immunity from judgments." Whether
an execution could issue after judgment the court expressly declined to decide.
But it is to be pregumed, the opinion states, that the Director-General of Rail-
roads would permit such a judgment to be paid. The construction of the statute
seems sound. A distinction may well be taken between such a suit as this and a
proceeding to compel a carrier to construct connecting tracks, as in Commercial
Club of Mitchell v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. (i918, S. Dak.) i7o N.
W. 149.
WATER-RIGHETS-MILL PRIVILEGEs-OwNERSHIP OF SoiE.-PRivIEGE OF FisH-
iNG.-The fee of land with a millpond thereon was conveyed to the defendant,
who was to hold subject to "mill privileges." The same grantor conveyed to
the plaintiff the privilege to use the water for the maintenance and operation
of his mill. The defendant prevented the plaintiff from fishing in the millpond.
The plaintiff brought a bill to enjoin this interference. Held, that relief must be
denied, as the grant to the defendant carried with it all privileges except the
mill privileges. Thompson v. Tennyson (i919, Ga.) 98 S. E. 353.
By the grant of the fee simple the defendant secured all the essentials of
full ownership-an almost complete aggregate of rights, privileges, powers,
immunities, etc., relating to the land and the millpond. The plaintiff, on the
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other hand, received only whatever privileges, etc., were reasonably required
for the use, maintenance and operation of the mill. Therefore the plaintiff,
like any other person, was subject to a multital duty not to fish in the millpond.
See (I913) 23 YALE LAW JouNAmi, 16; (917) 27 ibid. 67.
WonMEN's COMPENSATio-DisFGurEEMENT-DuAL CoMpENsAToN.-While
in the course of his employment, the plaintiff's arms and fingers were burned,
so that they were permanently disabled. His face and head was also burned,
seriously disfiguring him. The circuit court allowed compensation for perma-
nent partial incapacity and also for serious and permanent disfigurement.
Held, that the award was proper. Wells Bros. Co. v. Industrial Commission
(1918, Ill.) 121 N. E. 256.
This case involves the construction of an amendment to the Illinois Compen-
sation Act. Laws 1915, 403. Before this amendment, there could not be
recovery for both incapacity and disfigurement. Stubbs v. Industrial Com.
(1917) 280 Ill. 208, 117 N. E. 419. The New York statute has been similarly
amended so as to permit double recovery. Erickson v. Preuss (1918) 223 N. Y.
365, 119 N. E. 555; (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1097. For a discussion of the
theory underlying an award which is not based on loss of earning power, see
Bohlen, Some Problems Under Workmen's Compensation Laws (igig) 67
PENN. L. REv. 62.
W&KMEN'S CoMPENSATIoN-INJuRY DUE TO THIW PERsoN's FAULT-ErEcrTo
OF REMmY.-The plaintiff, an employee who had elected to come under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, was injured in the course of his employment
by the negligence of the defendant, a third party who had elected not to be
bound by the Act. After receiving compensation from his employer, the plain-
tiff brought an action against the defendant for negligence. The defendant
pleaded that the employee was not the proper party plaintiff, since the employer
had paid the required compensation. Held, that he was a proper party plaintiff.
Jones v. Fisher (i919, Ill.) 122 N. E. 95.
Where an employee has been injured under such circumstances as would give
him a common-law right of action against a third party, the Illinois Act distin-
guishes between the case where all parties have accepted the Act and where the
third party" had not accepted the Act. In the former, the employee is limited to
his claim for compensation against his employer. Friebel v. Chicago City Ry.
(1917) 280 Ill. 76, 117 N. E. 467. In the latter, which is the principal case, the
common-law right is reserved to the employee, subject to his repayment to the
employer of the amount received in compensation. See Houlihan v. Sulzberger
& Sons Co. (1917) 282 Ill. 76, 118 N. E. 429. The Connecticut Act does not
make this distinction, the common-law right being reserved to the employee in
either case. Gen. St. I918, sec. 5346. For the subrogation of the employer to
the rights of the employee, see (I918) 27 YALm LAw JouRNAL, 708; and (1918)
27 ibid. 971.
